Raising rivals’ costs strategy: test on two LAFS in Europe by Jeanneaux, Philippe et al.






1 VETAGRO SUP Campus agronomique de Clermont/UMR Métafort – F-63370 Lempdes 












PAPER PREPARED FOR THE 116
TH EAAE SEMINAR "Spatial Dynamics in 










Copyright 2010  Jeanneaux Ph., Barjolle D., Meyer D.All rights reserved. Readers may 
make verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
   2 






1 VETAGRO SUP Campus agronomique de Clermont/UMR Métafort – F-63370 Lempdes 
2 AFFE-IED ETHZ, CH-8032 Zurich 
Abstract - Some Localised Agro-Food Systems (LAFS) 
are traditionally qualified as success stories (Comté 
PDO in France, Gruyere PDO in Switzerland, 
Parmigiano Reggiano PDO in Italy), whilst other PDOs 
(as for example the Cantal PDO from France) pay the 
same price for the milk as standard milk.   The price 
difference may reach between 10 and 25% over a long 
period. 
To explain this difference, we assume that the agents 
who make up the LAFS developed a collective action to 
protect their localized cheese production system against 
unfair competition and to promote their product outside 
its region of origin. The aim of this communication is to 
shed light on levers which the agents activate to assure 
their uniqueness is irrevocable, and uphold the benefits 
of their LAFS. 
We propose to discuss the idea that the search for 
market power based on the strategy of raising rivals’ 
costs may be used even outside a situation of vertical 
integration or a situation in which pressure is applied to 
suppliers to challenge competitors. We assume that some 
companies within the LAFS have sufficient control on 
the rules governing the organization of the traditional 
system to benefit from it. They also succeed in protecting 
a kind of relationship between business companies. The 
Raising Rivals’ Costs theory helps to analyze the 
economic consequences of the legal set-up 
implementation and of its control by some companies.  
Indeed, we show that the collective control of the 
rules which are set up in the PDO legal framework 
explain the difficulties met by rivals to stand out 
through an alternative and independent production 
system based on the costs leadership strategy. The 
collective set up of institutions and rules help the agents 
to achieve a collective competitive advantage in which 
every agent benefits individually. This is the strategy 
developed in Europe and particularly for two PDO 
Localised Agro-cheese Systems: Comté PDO for France 
and Gruyère PDO for Switzerland. 
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With the Common Agricultural Policy’s shift 
(abandonment of the milk quota system and 
redefinition of the CAP) the future of dairy production 
in mountain regions raises numerous questions for 
private and public stakeholders. Dairy farmers in 
mountain regions tend to turn toward cheese 
production with distinctive product quality schemes 
based on localised agro-food systems (LAFS). These 
initiatives show variable success with regard to milk 
production price. Some are considered as success 
stories (PDO Comté in France, PDO Gruyère in 
Switzerland, PDO Parmigiano Reggiano in Italy) [1], 
others (for instance PDO Cantal) do not show benefit 
while showing some of the lowest prices for raw milk 
at farm gate [2]. 
The objective of this paper is to explain the price 
differences while analysing the regulatory mechanisms 
of the concerned LAFS. It leads to the discussion on 
market power at the different levels of the supply 
chain (producers, processors, etc.) and on the way they 
organise themselves collectively for setting and 
controlling production requirements which impact 
price mechanisms. Our thesis states that production 
systems or organizations, in order to increase their 
competitive advantage, seek to control three levers: 
the creation of economic value, how this value gets 
distributed among the stakeholders, and how the cost 
level control helps to preserve this collective strategy. 
PDO supply chains exemplify LAFS as the production 
and processing must, by legal definition, take place in 
a specific territory. With regard to PDO cheese supply 
chains, the collective regulation relies on the collective 
governance mode (territory or sectoral) based on the 
use of the three levers in the system: 
-  Added value creation depends on the mechanisms 
set to control volumes of production, and to 
indicate product differentiation [3]; 
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-  Cost control as a lasting competitive advantage 
does not necessarily aim at reducing but depends 
on the production requirements and the collective 
organisation’s ability to have them applied by all 
agents. The collective ruling and control of the 
code of practices can be understood as a strategy 
to raise competitor’s costs and therefore prevent 
them from imposing another production system 
mostly based on cost leadership [4]; 
-  The distribution of value along the supply chain 
depends on the presence of an institutionalised 
guidance mechanism of upstream prices according 
to downstream product quality [5]. 
This analytical framework highlights the diversity 
of the states’ role when delegating its ruling power for 
economic affairs to collective organisations which can 
control legal regulation mechanisms (for instance: 
contracts, code of practices, production planning and 
control). 
 
  We can demonstrate while focusing on the 
collective strategies and coordination mechanisms, 
how the three regulation levers result in preventing the 
entry to rivals who would not apply the rules. PDO 
supply chains entail small enterprises competing with 
much bigger sized companies including 
multinationals, which as well restrain competition 
while setting other types of barriers to entry (branding, 
contracting on quantities with retail industry, creating 
a competitive environment between suppliers of 
different regions, relocation in search of cheap labour, 
etc.). The competitive pressure on the PDO enterprises 
may even threaten the existence of the whole supply 
chain.  The implementation of the collective strategy 
can explain the noticed gap in the milk price even 
though other factors intervene like the official 
recognition and therefore protection of the PDO name, 
consumers’ preference, consumption trends, the 
strength of competition and substitution products, etc. 
[6]. 
We have tested this analytical model on two 
European PDO supply chains that present similar 
characteristics in the production technology and the 
organisation, though with different institutional 
frameworks. 
We will first present the analytical framework for 
the regulatory modes of the PDO supply chains based 
on the three dimensions (II), and then expose the 
empirical results (III). We will then discuss the 
relevance of our analytical framework to explain the 
diversity of regulatory modes used in PDO cheese 
supply chains and their linkage with the price level at 
farm gate (IV), before concluding (V). 
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
REGULATORY MODES 
Our analytical framework has to be considered in 
the vast domain of laws and economics based on the 
observation of “law in action” using direct legal 
sources. This discipline aims at analysing and 
understanding the economical consequences of 
operating legal mechanisms [7]. The legal elements 
form the relevant dimensions for the stakeholders for 
setting and implementing an economical strategy 
while seeking to influence their institutional 
environment and the relations between the economic 
stakeholders. 
We propose to use two different analytical grids to 
explain the performance of the two supply chains 
expressed as raw milk price to remunerate dairy 
farmers. 
- On one side, an analytical grid of the production 
system will include three key elements: the creation of 
added value, the distribution between the stakeholders 
along the value chain from agricultural production to 
the end product, and its protection with a cost control 
mechanism.  
- On the other side, an analytical grid of the 
governance modes (sectoral vs. territorial) of the 
supply chain [8] [9]. It sheds light on the relations 
between the stakeholders, in particular on the 
delegation of power to an institutionalised and 
administrated authority (supply chain organisation, 
product organisation) that plays an essential role for 
the collective management of the product. 
A. Analytical grid of the production system and its 
regulation 
We postulate that each organisation or each 
production system (i) seeks to create value (ii) in order 
to remunerate the production factors (iii) while 
seeking to create a lasting competitive advantage. 
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(i) Creating value 
The first dimension is about value creation within 
the system. Two elements will play a role on the level 
of created value: 
The first element involves the stakeholders’ 
capacity to take advantage of the specific resources on 
their territory to feed into the differentiation strategy 
[10]. We refer to local know-how which creates 
product’s uniqueness (cattle feed, local practices, 
seasonal dimension …). Know-how originates from a 
long lasting analysis and interpretation made by the 
agents in a collective manner. It is challenging to 
identify the relation «terroir-product» and to 
communicate it to the intermediate customers or end 
consumers. To acknowledge specificity, the practices 
will be officially registered in the PDO protocols and 
will be communicated in the media campaign of 
product promotion (individual or collective). 
The second element is about production control and 
monitoring. Indeed, the supply system should not go 
through over- or underproduction periods in order to 
balance supply with demand, restrain price volatility, 
and optimise the quality and sales of the product.   
Several supply management modalities can be 
identified thanks to the case studies. One can manage 
scarcity, as well as restrain lower quality products. In 
theory, there are multiple ways for managing cheese 
supply. It may include (non-exhaustive list): the quota 
system (allocation of annual rights to produce cheese); 
the control of market opening (campaign planning); 
the control of the territory where production takes 
place including the reduction of the zone; the 
financing of redirecting milk overproduction to 
standardized markets; as well as the implementation of 
export support measures. Quality management through 
cheese selection and downgrading is an effective and 
profitable tool when the cheese reprocessing industry 
can take advantage of the downgraded quantities. The 
practicalities for managing supply are set in a code of 
practices or through other means (campaign planning 
which have to be approved by the state in France; 
decisions of the supply chain organisations which have 
mandatory nature in Switzerland). 
 (ii) Distributing value 
The second dimension concerns the distribution of 
added value through the different levels of the supply 
chain. Outsourcing indeed affects the remuneration of 
production factors. The extent of the distribution of the 
value between the levels of the supply chain can be 
measured by analysing milk and cheese price settings. 
In theory, the bilateral price setting mechanism 
between stakeholders can be institutionally guided by 
the PDO supply chain organisation. Several options 
can be considered. Price policy sets the terms for 
bilateral transactions.  
For instance, upstream price setting can be based on 
the real cheese value obtained on the market. Price 
calculation may result out of market data which are 
made publicly available (cheese price depending on 
quality and weighed by volume). This mechanism 
might be formalised with a standard contract approved 
by the stakeholders of the supply chain.  
In other instances, the milk price at farm gate may 
be set without relation to the selling price of cheese 
originating from each individual delivery point. Price 
negotiation may then refer to more general data on 
national or European market prices for dairies (CNIEL 
grid in France).  
Negotiation may as well happen through mutual 
agreement based on market leader’s price level, rather 
than considering the real performance of the milk 
buying company. Further measures (quality based 
price following a grid set up by the supply chain 
interprofessional organisation, equalisation fund, 
direct payement) can be put in place to support the 
price setting mechanism. 
(iii) Create the product’s competitive advantage to 
fight against some competitors 
 
As many other economic sectors, the European milk 
and dairy sectors are marked by the rising power of 
big industrial groups creating a situation of quasi-
oligopoly. Their position is mostly based on large 
economies of scale. These economies of scale also 
depend on the way the value chain is organized, 
allowing to reach low cost levels while reaching 
broadening markets. The value chain refers to the 
whole group of products and producers contributing to 
the market supply. According to Porter [11], the value 
chain analysis allows to find the contribution of each 
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activity to obtain a competitive advantage. It also 
allows assessing the costs generated by the different 
activities. In order to lower their costs, big industrial 
groups continuously arbitrate between in-house 
production and outsourcing, as well as spatial 
integration or splitting. In the case of dairy production, 
they have to take into account its strong territorial 
linkage. The implementation of these strategies 
constitutes massive competition attacks that result in 
eliminating competitors that do not succeed in 
developing alternative strategies. Big groups therefore 
aim as well at reducing competitive pressure at 
medium and long term. For them, the current tendency 
in organising production leads to the fragmentation of 
the production process [12]. Large industrial dairy 
groups mostly set up their processing plants within the 
major milk producing regions. Some companies 
remotely guide their whole supply chain while seeking 
a competitive advantage through cost leadership 
strategy. They define the production’s location, the 
processing and the product (type, volume) in order to 
optimise the value chain. Vertical integration of 
suppliers (and horizontal integration of competitors) is 
a result of large groups’ strategy for reducing 
production costs [13].  
By this mean, economies of scale are achieved as 
fix costs get distributed on bigger production batch. 
Following the line of Coase [14], Williamson [15] 
developed the idea that vertical integration depends on 
the potential achievement of economies of information 
resulting from the integration of economical relations. 
Companies tend to integrate their suppliers based on 
their asset’s specificities and the transactions’ 
frequency (contract’s specificity), in other words, on 
the potential reduction of transaction cost that 
companies can expect. 
In the case studies, another organisation of the 
production appears without matching with a small and 
medium-sized enterprises’ (SME) network of local 
subcontractors supplying big groups. It is actually a 
group of stages organised by the different stakeholders 
with the goal of reaching a competitive advantage 
[16].  
Our approach is in that sense original as it suggests 
that the seeking for market power can be founded on a 
strategy of raising competitors’ costs without 
necessarily cutting ones own production costs. The 
Raising Rivals’ Costs  theory  [17] [18] allows us to 
analyse the behaviour of searching market power. It 
states that suppliers’ integration or exclusive 
contracting with suppliers enables the specific 
stakeholder to impose, at supply level, higher costs to 
competitors while weakening their position. The 
“predatory” company seeks to take control of suppliers 
that are indispensible for the competitors, and induce 
higher prices for the intermediary goods or services 
compared to the cost the company bear. Competitors 
face an induced market power and see their profit 
being reduced by the cost increase and the pressure put 
by the predatory firm on the selling price of the end 
products. Focusing on the factors leading to vertical 
integration, this approach reverses the analysis as it 
suggests that suppliers’ integration does not allow 
lowering the production and/or transaction costs but 
instead imposing higher costs to weaken competition 
while integrating or taking control of their suppliers.  
We propose at this point that the Raising Rivals’ 
Costs Theory can be efficiently applied outside of it 
classical field (vertical integration or pressure put on 
suppliers to impose production costs on competitors). 
In the present paper, we propose that the collective 
and territorial control on the production requirements 
legally set in PDO code of practice is based on a 
collective strategy meant to raise competitors’ cost. 
This strategy is led and implemented by the PDO 
supply chains associations acting collectively like a 
firm while limiting its own ability to impose an 
alternative model based on cost leadership [19].  
We focus more specifically on cooperation 
processes within a territory where the agents organise 
themselves collectively around the production of a 
product with geographical and historical relevance. 
The collective organisation includes traditional mostly 
small-scale production structures that develop together 
a commercial differentiation strategy distinguished 
from the cost leadership strategy. To that purpose, the 
stakeholders set common rules of which 
implementation is supported by public regulation 
mechanisms. Thus they develop a collective and 
lasting competitive advantage from which each 
individual stakeholder can benefit [20]. Within this 
framework, firms do not only have to adapt but can 
play an active role while using their voice to influence 
International EAAE-SYAL Seminar – Spatial Dynamics in Agri-food Systems    6 
the institutional environment and the organisation of 
the relations between agents. 
B. The topic of the supply chain governance 
Promoting an original way to manage businesses, 
the governance of the supply chain (in this case PDO 
supply chains) results from the capacity of the 
different agents [21] (who have decision power) to 
collectively set the goals, the means and the actions’ 
rules. Thus we suppose that the existence of PDO 
supply chains depends on the capacity of the parties 
involved in the governance to collectively and 
formally define power relationships as well as formal 
and informal regulation mechanisms between agents. 
Some researches in industrial economy focus on the 
relations between firms’ strategy and their link to the 
“terroir”, not understood as a geographically limited 
zone but as a social construction by the agents 
involved within an innovation process. As territorial 
governance, we hold the proposed definition by 
Perrier-Cornet and Sylvander [22]: «  the effect of 
cooperation between stakeholders within a localised 
production network  ». It opposes against a sectoral 
governance «  which originates from cooperating 
within a specific field of activity with its own 
standards, rules, as well as competition and 
coordination regulations and mechanisms, and 
without referring to any kind of spatial dimension ». 
In order to highlight the heterogeneity of the PDO 
supply chains with regard to their linkage to the 
territory, some authors [23] [24] draw the distinction 
between territorial and sectoral governance while 
using three criteria: (1) standardisation mechanisms, 
(2) relationship between companies and competition’s 
type, and (3) relationship between farmers and 
processors. We propose an analytical grid (cf. table 1.) 
inspired by this analysis of territorial versus sectoral 
governance and crossed with our grid of the regulation 
of cheese production systems (cf. infra). 
Sectoral governance is understood as business 
management by a group of firms defending their 
interests in the name of their sector. Over time, these 
companies mostly merge with their competitors over 
time. As a result, the power relations between the 
economic agents of the sector mainly consist in 
negotiations between dairy farmers and the industrial 
level in the framework of an authority that is, in 
France, supported by the government. 
Territorial governance by managing organisations is 
a business management mode for collective matters 
that can be set off by the state. This organisation mode 
can take the form of a supply chain interprofessional 
organisation. Its ruling is based on the principles of 
decisions’ validation through majority, and of 
representativeness of the professional branches 
involved in the production system. In France, the 
supply chain interprofessional organisation is 
recognized by inter-ministerial bylaw and is subject to 
financial and economical control by the state. Whereas 
in the territorial governance, the organisation’s 
mission is to represent and defend the production 
system’s interests (the products and its agents). The 
supply chain organisation enables the agents to 
coordinate the regulations and the actions between 
them and which will take the form of inter-
professional agreements containing the code of 
practices, the collective marketing of the products, the 
definition of the production zone, and the setting of 
the dues for the organisation. The organisation relies 
on this policy for acting. The power relations between 
the stages are set up within the organisation creating 
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Table 1 : Characterisation of sectoral and territorial logic based on the criteria for analysing the 
regulation of cheese production systems (possible options, non systematic) 
 
  Sectoral Governance  Territorial Governance 
Value Creation 
 
Differentiation based on technology 
Internal supply control by each individual 
company (on several products and several 
locations) 
Common supply control (storage, intervention) 
Take advantage of specific local resources 
Supply control through managing scarcity : definition of 
the production zone, quota system, exclusion of low 
quality cheese and segmentation by quality grading  
Value 
Distribution 
Negotiation through mutual agreements 
between producers and the industry 
National price grid 
No relation between the selling price of the end 
product and the milk payment 
Institutional mechanism for setting price based on 
quality 
Standard contract  





Cost leadership strategy 
Individual branding strategy 
Vertical integration of suppliers 
Horizontal integration of competitors  
Geographical disintegration 
Differentiation strategy based on product-terroir linkage 
Barriers of entry for competitors by controlling the code 
of practices 
Impose costs to competitors (raising rivals’ costs 
strategy) 
Regulation of the 
production 
system 
Production system is controlled by market 
leaders (oligopoly) 
 
Power relation set up within an organisation dedicated to 
managing and protecting the product 
The state gives power of attorney to the organisation. 
    
 
C. Method 
To discuss this framework, we have analysed two 
PDO cheese supply chains (Comté in France and 
Gruyère in Switzerland) at the different stages (dairy 
farmers, cheese-makers, and cheese-ripeners) using 
three major sources:  
(i) One source for characterising the dynamic of each 
cheese supply chain over a long period of time. The 
characteristics and the evolution of the productive 
structures at the different stages were analysed in 
order to recreate the agents’ paths. To obtain the data, 
we conducted a survey among the stakeholders and 
also used documentary sources (literature, articles, 
reports) [25] [26] [27]  ; (ii) One source for 
characterising the protection strategy of the production 
systems based on the analysis of the legal documents 
of each PDO. These documents sets the content of the 
PDO’s codes of practices and throw light on the 
production’s organisation and the constraints put on 
competitors ; (iii) One source for analysing the value 
creation and the mechanism for its distribution among 
the different stages of the supply chain. We identified 
the specific resources used, the productive structures 
of the supply chains (technical an social division of 
labour between stakeholders), the mechanisms for 
managing supply, as well as the fundamental inter-
professional agreements that set the payment 
modalities for cheese (standard contracts, etc.). 
III. RESULTS: PDO COMTÉ AND PDO GRUYÈRE: 
TWO SIMILAR STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING 
PRODUCTION SYSTEMS BASED ON 
TRADITION AND TERROIR  
We have chosen to discuss our analytical 
framework aiming at explaining the milk price 
differences in two similar contexts (PDO Comté and 
PDO Gruyère). For each supply chain, we present the 
productive and structural characteristics and the 
governance mode, so that to come up with 
explanations for a higher price level compared to 
substitute products.   8 
A. The Comté supply chain: dairy farmers, cheese-
makers and cheese-ripeners standing together within 
the largest French PDO cheese supply chain 
A traditional and dynamic cheese supply chain 
Agriculture in the Jura mountains is mainly 
dedicated to milk production that feeds into cheese 
supply chains benefiting from a legal recognition 
through an official quality label (several PDOs  : 
Comté, Morbier, Mont d’Or, Bleu de Gex). These 
products originate from the Doubs and Jura 
Departments, grouping, in 2008, 3’420 dairy farmers 
producing more than 760 millions litres of milk. 
Among them, 3’000 farmers produced 52’000 tons of 
Comté. Since 1990, the Comté production 
significantly increased by more than 15’000 tons. 
From a historical perspective, the PDO Comté was the 
most important vector to the organisational 
development of the cheese production system in the 
Jura, based on specific technical and social division of 
labour [28]. The dairy farmers, on one side, organised 
in collective cheese-making units (150 cheese-making 
cooperatives in 2005) control the processing from milk 
to fresh cheese (not ripened) and do not have market 
access. The cheese-ripeners (around 10 units in 2005), 
on the other side, have the quasi-exclusive access to 
market without being involved in the first processing 
stage. This labour division is still very present and 
generates a long-lasting collective value which is safe-
guarded by the successful setting of the Protected 
Denomination of Origin Comté. 
A powerful interprofessional organisation for guiding 
the supply chain 
Comté production is an original form of economical 
cooperation, whose safeguard was established through 
a three steps construction process for the protected 
denomination of origin: 
(i) The initial first phase aimed at obtaining the 
territorial exclusivity for the product. The Comté 
indeed benefits from a PDO’s protection with a ruling 
of the Magistrates’ Court of Dijon in 1952. Almost 50 
years later, the PDO’s zone was scaled down (1998), 
matching with its effective production’s territory and 
preventing the late and opportunistic development of 
the production in the Haute-Saône Department which 
borders the historical production zone (Doubs and Jura 
Departments); 
(ii) The second step consisted in collectively setting 
the production standards defining the production 
system. The agents together fixed the requirements for 
the dairy farmers of the land zone who were included 
in the initial PDO zone. The code of practices 
successively evolved towards excluding intensive 
agriculture practices like corn silage feed for the 
Prim’Holstein breed. A thorough reflection on the 
product quality and its linkage to the terroir led then 
to a precise definition of the best agriculture practices, 
to be fulfilled in order to reach high gustatory quality 
for Comté cheese. Raw milk and feed based on grass 
and hay are crucial requirements that were highlighted 
in numerous research studies [29]. The code of 
practices match with the production conditions 
prevailing for Montbéliard cattle breeders located in 
the mountainous area. The implementation of the code 
of practices (prohibition of feeding silage to the whole 
herd, GMOs’ prohibition, mandatory use of local 
breeds as Montbéliard or Simmental, milking robot 
banned, land load limitation ratio of one hectare 
fodder per milking cow, maximum milk-land 
productivity ratio of 4’600 litre milk per hectare, 
cows’ grazing mandatory) impact on the production 
costs and exclude, from the production system, cattle 
breeders using more intensive agricultural practices 
like silage feeding. The production zone is now 
limited to the Jura Mountains, bringing consistency 
between the final product and the conditions of 
production. The prohibition of cheese production at 
dairy farm stage established the role of the cheese-
makers and their specific know-how. The code of 
practices enable the cheese-making cooperatives to 
highlight their contribution to product quality and 
protect them from industrial competitors via a series of 
rulings in 1976, 1979, 1986, 1994, 1998 and 2007. 
With the exception of the PDO zone’s reduction, all 
the rulings focused on promoting small-scale local 
dairy units (no heating treatment for the milk, no robot 
for the processing activities, restriction of the milk 
collection area, size limitation of the processing unit). 
Therefore, it forces large industrial groups involved in 
the supply chain to respect the production 
requirements at dairy stage and thus, similar 
production costs. 
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(iii) Finally, a third phase sought to control the 
cheese supply. The interprofessional Comté 
organisation controls today its supply through a 
mechanism of “campaign planning” wich defines the 
volume of production every year to avoid cheese 
shortage, overproduction and price volatility. 
The barriers to entry raised by the code of practices 
for milk and cheese processing are necessary to 
protect the specificity and link to the terroir founding 
the competitive advantage of the product. The surplus 
created through this original organisation of the 
production corresponds to higher production costs 
resulting from restrictive conditions that make the 
specific quality and image of the product. The creation 
of values is effective if the cheese-makers together 
with the cheese-ripeners agree on the crucial elements 
determining quality differentiation, identity, image and 
long-term reputation at the consumers’ level. This 
value constitutes a surplus as the selling price paid for 
the end product by buyers external to the supply chain 
is higher than what the agents would have obtained 
without collaborating. The surplus resulting from the 
organisation originates from the PDO code of 
practices [30]. The Comté supply chain is often 
considered a model of collective action. It set a 
powerful organization and giving extended authority 
for negotiating and implementing Comté supply 
control measures, as well as promoting the 
differentiation strategy which protects the interests of 
the Jura dairy farmers, small-scale cheese-makers and 
ripening facilities. The Comté supply chain shaped the 
agro-food sector in this mountainous region and 
supported the selling price of that cheese. In 2007, the 
average price was 10.20 €/kg compared to 7.10€/kg 
for French Emmental
1, that is to say a positive price 
difference of 47% in favour of the Comté
2.  
A mechanism for distributing surplus set at the core of 
the PDO Comté’s logic  
Until today, the supply chain organized the surplus’ 
distribution between «  production  » and «  market  ». 
The system’s efficiency was based on the regulated 
distribution of the collective surplus that allowed dairy 
                                                           
1Source : syndicat français de pâtes pressées cuites 2007 
2Source CIGC : http://www.comte.com/le-marche-du-
comte,4,0,8,1,1.html 
farmers, over the last 15 years (excepted 2007) to 
reach a 20% higher price for milk (until 25%) 
compared to national average.  
The resilience of the Comté supply chain 
organisation persisted over time as cattle breeders and 
local small capital-holders shared common interests 
[31]. Until recently, the number of units at first 
processing stage granted the cheese-ripeners with a 
diversity of cheese’s taste that was valued by the local 
and specialised buyers. While obtaining comfortable 
profit margins, the cheese-ripeners accepted to share 
the added value, following a standard contract set and 
enforced by the interprofessional organization (named 
Comité  Interprofessionnel du Gruyère de Comté: 
CIGC). Cheese-ripeners may amend the contract; 
however the specifications should be at least as strict 
as the standard contract’s. 
The cheese-ripeners must declare their sales’ 
volumes and selling prices for ripened cheese to the 
CIGC on a monthly basis. The organisation then 
publishes a weighted average price of the monthly 
sales: the so-called MNPC, acronym standing for 
“Moyenne Pondérée Nationale Comté”. This reference 
price will help establishing the cheeses’ final price. 
The price for fresh cheese (not yet ripened) is 
calculated on the base of the MNPC, and published. In 
addition, the fresh cheese quality grading is sanctioned 
in the price through the use of specific ratios. These 
ratios are negotiated by the dairy farmers, who are 
simultaneously shareholders of the cheese-making 
cooperatives, and the cheese-ripeners. This mechanism 
stands at the core of the value distribution process. 
The cooperatives can then establish the average milk 
price.  
So, the milk price is set through deducting the 
processing costs from the monthly turnover of each 
individual unit (sales of Comté, butter and milk whey). 
The result is then divided by the delivered quantities 
of each farmer participating to the cooperative. The 
milk price at farm gate still undergoes further 
adaptations based on chemical composition and 
bacteriological quality. The milk pricing changes 
monthly and primarily depends on the milk quality at 
producers’ stage and the ability of the cheese-maker in 
maximizing the cheese-milk ratio and minimizing the 
processing costs (cheese-makers’ salary most often 
depend on the amount of the turnover). The milk price 
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depends as well on the negotiation skills of the dairy 
farmers (as they also control most of cheese-making 
cooperatives) when discussing within the collective 
organisation the calculation ratio for fresh cheeses.   
B. The Gruyère PDO: a new differentiation strategy 
bringing together breeders, cheese-makers and 
cheese-ripeners 
A growing traditional cheese supply chain 
With a tonnage of 28’206 tons in 2008, the Gruyère 
amounts for 16 % of the Swiss cheese production and 
41% of the Swiss PDO volume. In the 1990’s, the 
Gruyère production was around 24'000 tons and 
reached over 29'000 tons in 2009, almost taking over 
the production of Emmental in the decrease since 1990 
(going from 56’600 tons to 30’000 tons in 2009). 
About 2’800 dairy farmers produce 340 millions litres 
milk yearly processed in 180 cheese-making facilities 
and 52 alps (grazing season). The production of 
29’000 tons of Gruyère (including 800 tons of organic 
cheese and 490 tons of alp cheese) are sold to 9 
cheese-ripeners who manage the sales outside the 
supply chain. In 2009, 40% of the Gruy?e volume was 
exported and 7% went to the reprocessing industry 
(non-PDO cheese). Like the Comté’s, the Gruy?e’s 
supply chain is based on a great number of dairy 
farmers, small-scale cheese-making entities and a few 
cheese-ripeners. The cheese-makers control the 
processing and only marginally sell cheese onsite for 
local customers. The cheese-makers are independant 
entrepreneurs and the cooperatives of which farmers 
are members do not exist at the contrary to Comté’s 
supply chain. According to the inter-professional 
organization, the cheese-ripeners ensure a better 
market access and higher value for the cheese as they 
hold high volumes which give them a better position 
for negotiating. However, the role of the cheese-
makers remains crucial as the cheese wheels mature 
for three and half months in the cheese-maker’s 
cellars, inducing additional costs at cheese-making 
level (the minimal duration of maturation is five 
months). The cheese-ripeners have exclusivity for the 
market access and do not interfere in the cheese 
production. The surplus resulting from the PDO 
collective organisation is based on the negotiation of 
production and trade conditions for milk and fresh 
cheese while setting stringent traditional technical 
requirements in the terms of reference. Number and 
distribution of the cheese-makers within the zone 
generate a great cheese diversity through the sourcing 
(plain or mountain) and the ripening duration. This 
diversity is comparable to the Comté’s.  
From a publicly administrated supply chain to an 
autonomous governance by an inter-professional 
organisation  
In the beginning of the nineties, public support 
guaranteeing cheese sales ended and seriously 
challenged the Gruy?e supply chain. The state used to 
buy the whole supply when the cheese reached three 
and half month age. This practice had to stop with the 
enforcement of the GATT agreements signed in 1994. 
The Swiss Federal Department of Public Economy 
started a consultation procedure for a new agriculture 
bill suppressing price guarantee for milk, opening 
borders to some cheeses import, and reducing 
subsidies for agriculture goods exported to the 
European Union. The withdrawal of state’s support in 
1999 and the disappearance of the protectionist market 
structures raised many questions as to how to 
collectively organise cheese production in 
Switzerland. The federal legislation then opened new 
opportunities for the agro-food sector in defining 
collective organisation to which stakeholders could 
freely adhere [32]. Agents active in specific product 
supply chains gathered and developed inter-
professional organisations while completing the 
horizontal structures (producers’ organisation, dairy 
association, cheese-wholesalers and exporters’ 
association). New forms of solidarity arose on the base 
of specific products link to their terroir. The 
regulation on inter-professional organisations leads the 
Swiss Confederation to enforce quality promotion and 
product marketing measures as well as supply 
management mechanisms based on market demand. 
Strict conditions were defined as to which organisation 
was entitled to receive a mandatory power for 
enforcing its decisions. 
 
At the same time, the supply chain was facing the 
potential development of industrial dairies. In the 
1990, the Cremo group (market leader in the Swiss 
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butter industry) with several cheese-makers planed to 
set up an 뱒emi-industrial?Gruy?e production facility 
(milk collection every second day, shortened ripening 
duration, large volumes, changes at several steps in the 
production process). At the same time, severe 
challenges in marketing the Swiss Emmental cheese 
indeed led some Emmental cheese-makers to plan to 
switch production for Gruy?e. These attempts were 
threatening the traditional character of the Gruy?e and 
the supply chain welfare in the cantons where 
production was historically founded. Still in the 
nineties, the Gruy?e production originated for 95% 
from the cantons Vaud, Fribourg, Jura, Bernese Jura, 
and Neuch?el. Several stakeholders started a 
recognition process for the future PDO Gruy?e and 
took steps to defend the local and traditional practices 
and to counter the development of the production 
outside the traditional zone. 
These circumstances lead, in the nineties, the 
stakeholders to structure their approach successively 
through a Charter, an Inter-professional Body, and 
finally to code of practices for the PDO. Led by the 
Gruy?e’s supply chain, the creation of the Charter 
followed by the PDO protection set the ground to 
maintain a traditional production within a context of 
industrialisation and State disengagement. 
 
They could not wait for the future Swiss legislation on 
PDO-PGI to be ready but largely contributed to its 
development [33]. Counting on the specificity of the 
product and a traditional production process relying on 
labour division, the stakeholders first drafted a 
Charter, setting the ground for the PDO. This 
document was signed on the 2
nd of July 1992 and 
defined the conditions for milk production, cheese-
making and ripening.  
Feeding silage was banned (hay as a main feed for 
cold periods) and the milk could not be treated (except 
cooling). Milk processing should take place in copper 
tank within 18 hours after the last milking. The 
cheese-maker had to use rennet with home-grown milk 
bacteria and could not reincorporate whey cream. 
Besides, the Gruy?e’s Charter foresaw that a specific 
commission should develop a code of practices for the 
PDO Gruy?e. Finally, the PDO Gruy?e was 
recognized in 2001 and registered in the Geographical 
Indications’ Register of the Federal Office of 
Agriculture. The code of practices was also approved 
[34] and included most of the elements of the Gruy?e 
Charter while adding further points. The conditions of 
production and processing were more detailed and, in 
particular, the ripening process had to last minimum 5 
months before sales. Only the first and second milking 
can be mixed together for processing Gruy?e. It cannot 
contain growth hormones or other synthetic hormones. 
Milk tanks should be open and made out of copper 
with a maximal content of 6’600 litres and can be used 
for another cheese type production after washing. 
Cheese processing takes place first and once a day. 
Besides, the distance between the cheese-making 
facility and the dairy famer has to be smaller as a ray 
of 20 km, and milk has to be delivered twice a day 
after milking. Gruy?e production in the Alps takes 
place during the grazing season as long as mountain 
pastures are sufficient to cover the basic feed intake of 
the cattle. The processing must be located on the alp. 
The code of practices implicitly limits the size of the 
processing units and the structures on the zone. 
Industrial groups like Cremo (holder since 2002 of a 
processing facility for organic Gruy?e with a capacity 
of 6 millions litres per year) cannot develop a strategy 
based on cost leadership through rationalisation of the 
production process, production volume expansion, 
shortening of the ripening duration, production 
facility’s expansion, or relocation of the activities.  
The PDO Gruy?e production follows a decentralised 
model maintaining an important economic activity 
through the 232 cheese-makers in the plain and the 
alps included in the PDO zone. The code of practices 
protect the traditional structures of the supply chain 
from industrialisation as production costs are identical 
for small facilities and large industrial groups that 
might be interested in entering the Gruy?e production 
and market. Above all, the Swiss agents strengthen 
and protect a traditional model under a support limited 
by the fact that the Swiss state respects the WTO 
rulings. This new model seems efficient as agriculture 
and cheese-processing structures did not massively 
weaken, Gruy?e volume evolved positively, and milk 
price kept up. Since a small decade, the price gap 
between milk meant for PDO Gruy?e and standard 
milk (meant for instance for Emmental production) is 
about 20 % (0.85 CHF for Gruy?e milk against 0.70 
CHF for standard milk on average). Though the State 
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supports specifically all the producers delivering milk 
for non-pasteurised cheese production with a subsidy 
of 15 Swiss cents per litre and the price gap can be 
traced back in the surplus. However, the other Swiss 
cheese supply chains, even the other Swiss PDO, do 
not achieve in paying such a high price for milk like 
the Gruy?e. The reason is to be found in the specific 
shaping and organisation of this supply chain. 
 
The interprofessional Gruy?e organisation plays an 
important role for creation of surplus as it hosted the 
negotiations resulting in setting quality criteria and 
supply management measures (quota for the cheese 
production facility, volume and price setting for the 
cheese meant to the reprocessing industry). The 
interprofessional Gruy?e organisation protected the 
creation of surplus bound to the PDO through a 
collective organisation set in the terms of reference 
matching with the traditional conditions of production 
of the Gruy?e supply chain. 
A mechanism of value distribution from upstream to 
downstream  
Before the milk season 1999/2000, milk price was 
guaranteed by the Swiss Confederation. Price, 
subsidies and quality grid were set for the whole 
territory whatever region, industry or product was 
concerned. Nowadays, the price for milk and cheese as 
well as the quality grid are negotiated between 
farmers, cheese-makers, and cheese-ripeners within 
the inter-professional Gruy?e organisation. These 
recommendations are mostly followed by the agents of 
the supply chain. 
The original aspect lays in the establishment of the 
recommended price. The final value of the final 
product is not used as a reference for calculating the 
milk price. Instead of it, the agents set a target milk 
price to which a margin for the cheese-makers is 
added, resulting in a minimum price for the Gruy?e on 
the market, Of course, this price is not disconnected to 
the market price and it is obvious that the consumers 
are willing to pay that price since the sells still 
increase at that level of prices. This process is 
facilitated on the Swiss market by the duopolistic 
organisation of the retail industry, also involved in the 
supply chain and, more generally, promoting products 
made in Switzerland.  
To achieve this presentation, we want precise that the 
milk price comprises a basis price (around 0.50 CHF 
per litre) to which incentive subsidies meant to guide 
production are added (PDO Gruy?e milk bonus: 0.10 
CHF/litre, quality bonus: 0.05 CHF/litre). Moreover, 
two subsidies depend on the agricultural policy: the 
bonus for the milk dedicated to cheese-production 
(0.15 CHF/litre) and the no-silage feed bonus (0.03 
CHF/litre).  
IV. DISCUSSION 
Both cheese production models for the Comté and 
the Gruyère are quite similar in the way they are 
organised. They both focus on a product whose name 
is protected, and rely on agents sharing collective 
interests and structured in a powerful inter-
professional organisation. These are interesting 
examples of collective action deploying a strategy of 
competitive advantage without considering cost leader 
strategy but product differentiation based on the 
product’s name, geographical origin and intrinsic 
quality (depending on the conditions of production and 
processing set in the code of practices). They 
exemplify what territorial governance can be. 
 
The analysis of the two PDO supply chains allows 
us to highlight that the price creation on the market 
depends on three major factors that give ground to our 
analytical grid for the regulation of production systems 
(cf table 2): 
- The first factor focuses on the value creation which 
depends, on one hand, on the use of specific territorial 
resources formalised in the production requirements 
appearing in the code of practices, and on the other 
hand, on the balance between supply and demand 
generated by the inter-professional organisation 
through the control of the production volume 
(production quota, campaign planning, export policy 
and marketing, etc.) and the quality (quality 
segmentation, grading, and clearing of low quality 
cheese towards the reprocessing industry).  
- The second factor focuses on the protection of the 
production model, which allows structuring the 
relations between dairy farmers, cheese-makers and 
cheese-ripeners. It is important to notice that the 
recognition and protection of the PDO does not 
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guarantee higher milk prices for the farmers [35] [36]. 
In addition, specific measures in the codes of practices 
protect traditional small-scale enterprises and farmers 
as they impose to their competitors (large dairy 
industry companies and intensive dairy farmers) 
specific production techniques and its related costs. 
We propose indeed, while using the Raising Rivals’ 
Costs Theory, an additional dimension to explain the 
strategies for raising competition’s costs (vertical 
integration of suppliers, exclusive contracting or 
collusion with suppliers). We debate the idea that the 
control of the regulations protecting a territorial 
production system constitute a lever for imposing to 
the competitors identical production costs compared to 
the traditional producers/processors’. 
 
The question is whether the PDO cheese production 
costs were in fact imposed to competitors by the 
defenders of the local PDO production system. It is 
very challenging to proceed to a precise analysis of the 
production costs at the different stages of the supply 
chain, which would support our theses of imposing 
production and processing costs to competitors. The 
information is confidential and the reconstitution of 
the costs would require, in the calculation, to integrate 
holdings costs that do not appear in the bookkeeping 
of the profit centres, without mentioning the 
modalities – for tax optimisation purpose – for 
invoicing between companies. Salop and Scheffman 
[37] defend moreover the idea (in a publication of 
1983) that the analysis of products’ price allows to 
assess the effective costs augmentation of competitors. 
They state that when production costs rise, usually 
selling prices rise as well. We compared the prices for 
PDO Comté with standard Emmental over 18 years at 
wholesaler stage, considering they related well to the 
production costs. From price parity in 1990, the 
average price for ripe Comté in 2007 was about 5’500 
€/ton against less than 4’500 €/ton for Emmental. We 
hypothesise that the 1’000 €/ton gap likely indicates a 
cost production difference between the traditional 
PDO Comté production system and the industrial 
production system permitted for Emmental. The 
presence of this gap may support the idea of a process 
of imposing production costs of the traditional supply 
chain on the competitors. This statement is even more 
credible that the industrial dairy groups present in the 
Comté supply chain are also involved in the Emmental 
production. They demonstrated their ability to produce 
hard cheese at low cost as they master economy of 
scales and low cost processing standards unlike the 
Comté production.  
- The third factor focuses on the distribution of the 
value added along the supply chain. While protecting 
their production practices, the dairy farmers could 
maintain a balance in the power they have in both 
local production systems, French and Swiss. The 
power relation allows weighing on the value 
distribution between the agents. On one side it brings 
transparency on the product’ price at market stage and 
supply management mechanisms negotiated within the 
supply chain’s organisation. On the other side, when 
the value of the final product is communicated, the 
power relation between the agents is rebalanced 
through the distribution of the producers’ surplus 
among the agents. A recommended price for the 
cheese or for the milk is collectively set and its 
implementation goes through a contract standard 
imposed to the agents.  
 
The conjunction of these three factors explains the 
price gap between the PDO productions (Gruyère and 
Comté) defending a specific model based on history 
and collectively built, and the industrial productions 
controlled by a few large dairies group. It includes as 
well a territorial governance dimension implemented 
by an inter-professional organisation having received a 
public mandate for managing domestic businesses, 
which explains the fair milk prices paid at farm gate. 
In our analysis, the inter-professional organisation, 
with its capacity to master supply volume and quality, 
and establish standard contracts defining price, 
appears as an institution giving the capacity to the 
supply chain to deliver and to distribute economic 
value in a fair manner between the agents while 
maintaining and protecting the collective organisation 
over time. This can however not be compared with a 
monopolistic situation as the agents still behave as 
competitors between each other, and because the 
legislation does not prevent newcomers as long as they 
respect the PDO code of practices. Benefits cannot be 
raised through lower production costs.  
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As a consequence, our analytical grid is interesting 
for explaining the regulation of localised cheese 
production systems. We are though very much aware 
of the limits of our approach as the hypothesis was 
only tested on two PDOs and it cannot be generalised. 
Further researche is presently conducted to test this 
analytical grid of the regulation modes of localised 
production systems. 
Table 2. Comparison of the regulations of the PDO Gruyère and the PDO Comté 
  PDO Gruyère (CH)  PDO Comté (F) 
Value creation  Use of specific territorial resources 
Recognition by the consumers of specific organoleptic 
qualities 
Segmentation through plain/mountain seasonal 
productions 
Supply control by managing quality and 
diversification at selling (quotas at processing stage, 
removal of low quality cheese via  reprocessing 
industry, export promotion policy) 
Use of specific territorial resources 
Recognition by the consumers of specific organoleptic 
qualities 
Supply control through quality management (reduction of 
the production zone, quotas on cheese, removal of low 




Institutional guidance of prices from upstream to 
downstream 
Definition of a recommended price retaining balance 
in the power distribution at the different stages of the 
supply chain  
Rebalancing through bonus including public subsidies 
(for silage ban, quality, cheese processing, etc) 
Institutional guidance of prices from downstream to 
upstream  
Standard contract including a balancing mechanism for 
distributing value along the supply chain 
Price transparency (monthly price declaration and 
calculation of a basis average weighed price for cheese)  




Barriers to entry towards the competitors (promoting 
industrialisation) by controlling production conditions  
 
Differentiation strategy 
Barriers to entry towards the competitors (promoting 
industrialisation) by controlling production conditions  
Imposing costs to competitors 
Regulation mode 
of the system 
Power relation dealt within the interprofessional 
organisation 
 
Power relation dealt within a managing interprofessional 
organisation  
State gives power of attorney to the managing organisation
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